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1  | INTRODUC TION
“If you are a Hungarian, your basic state of mind is 
the feeling of betrayal.” (Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister 
of Hungary, to an interviewer of the Austrian Kleine 
Zeitung, May 2019)
What Mr. Orbán offers “is little more than the same 
authoritarian nationalism practiced by thugs and 
charlatans throughout the 20th century – including 
Hungary's pro-Nazi world War II regime.… Mr. Orbán 
has excluded himself from the democratic West; he 
and his government should be treated accordingly.” 
Washington Post, Editorial, August 26, 2014.
The emergence in the past few years of populist, anti-liberal po-
litical movements in a number of countries presents an important 
challenge for psychologists (Albright, 2018; Pinker, 2018). While mil-
lions of would-be migrants see Western liberal democracies as their 
best hope for a better future, many voters in the very same countries 
are now turning their backs on their successful and well-tried political 
model. The rise of populism occurred in both highly developed Western 
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What are the psychological processes responsible for the recent spread of populist 
political systems and movements? All political systems essentially reflect the mental 
representations of their populations, and collective narcissism has recently emerged 
as a contributing factor in the rise of populism. This article presents two studies ex-
amining the role of collective narcissism in predicting populist attitudes and voting 
intentions in Hungary. Hungary offers a particularly important case study of state-
sponsored populism and illiberalism in Europe, as this country has gone furthest in 
undermining democratic principles and practices within the EU. To establish the per-
vasive role of collective narcissism we first review the historical evidence, survey 
research, and narrative analyses of Hungarian political representations. We then pre-
sent two empirical studies where we predicted and found that collective narcissism 
was a significant predictor of negative attitudes toward the EU (Study 1), conserva-
tism, and support for the ruling populist party (Studies 1 and 2). Collective narcissism 
predicted these variables independently from other factors, such as in-group positiv-
ity or perceived relative deprivation. However, once conservatism was controlled for 
the effects of collective narcissism faded out in some cases. The results nevertheless 
indicate that collective narcissism plays important role in promoting populist politics. 
The implications of these findings for understanding the psychological appeal of pop-
ulism and illiberalism are discussed.
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countries (e.g., USA, Britain, France, and Austria) and in nations with 
weak democratic traditions (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Russia). 
This paper explores the role of psychological factors, such as collective 
narcissism, in the rise of populism in Hungary. Hungary is now arguably 
the most “populist” and illiberal nation within the EU (Garton Ash, 2019) 
and the first member state in the history of the EU to be categorized 
as not a democracy (Freedom House, 2020). Specifically, we seek to 
explain how endemic feelings of betrayal and inferiority as reflected in 
the quote above by Mr. Orbán can lead to the spread of authoritarian 
nationalism and populism as identified in the second quote above.
1.1 | Collective narcissism
The mental representations of nations or cultures have long been 
of interest to social psychologists, going back to Wundt's work on 
“Voelkerpsychologie” (Allport, 1924; Forgas, 1980; Wundt, 1911). 
We also know that human beings have a strong propensity to believe 
in various shared collective fictions, and almost any symbolic narra-
tive can influence political behavior (Harari, 2014; Hobsbawm, 1992; 
Koestler, 1959).
In particular, the universal need for positive group identity may 
predispose voters to succumb to populist government propaganda 
(Albright, 2018). Recent work suggests that collective narcissism, 
defined as a belief that one's own group is exceptional and entitled 
to privileged treatment, but that it is not sufficiently recognized by 
others, lies at the core of many populist beliefs (Golec de Zavala 
et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). We can see collec-
tive narcissism in this light: as yet another shared fictional narrative 
extolling the unappreciated virtues of the threatened in-group, and 
thus, satisfying deep-seated need for positive group identity.
Historically, narcissism is a psychoanalytic concept that applied 
to individuals. The possibility that narcissistic beliefs may be ap-
plied to entire groups was first entertained by Adorno (1997) and 
Fromm (1964/2010). Unlike earlier formulations, the contemporary 
understanding of collective narcissism makes no assumptions about 
pathological intrapsychic processes. Instead, collective narcissism is 
understood as a set of interrelated social psychological beliefs about 
the in-group that mirror the way individual narcissists think about 
themselves vis-à-vis others, emphasizing unrecognized greatness. 
Recent empirical work successfully differentiated this psychological 
concept from other in-group attitudes, including nationalism, patri-
otism, in-group glorification, in-group attachment, and in-group sat-
isfaction (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). However, the relationship 
between collective narcissism and conservatism remains unclear 
(Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 
2019).
Collective narcissism can also be empirically measured using 
the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), fea-
turing items adapted from psychological measures of individual nar-
cissism to a group level. As Golec de Zavala et al. (2019) suggest, 
just “as people can demand special recognition and privilege for 
themselves (as individual narcissists do), they can claim the same 
for the groups they belong to (as collective narcissists do). …the in-
tergroup consequences of collective narcissism often parallel the 
interpersonal consequences of individual narcissism: hostility, ex-
aggerated reactions to negative feedback and criticism, or lack of 
empathy” (p. 38). Collective narcissism has been a common feature 
of fascist ideologies: in the 1930's, Germans, Italians, and Japanese 
all believed in their innate racial and cultural superiority and deserv-
ingness (Albright, 2018). Collective narcissism is also characteristic 
of various Jihadist movements, who see their sacred religion and 
culture as inherently superior to others (Ginges, 2015; Kruglanski & 
Fishman, 2009).
Collective narcissism is also closely related to Tajfel's work on 
in-group favoritism in the minimal group experiments (Tajfel & 
Forgas, 2000). According to this view, spontaneous intergroup dis-
crimination is driven by the universal need for positive self-worth, 
achieved through maximizing positive in-group distinctiveness. This 
view is supported by findings showing that people often prefer to 
maximize in-group/out-group' differences rather than simply max-
imizing in-group rewards (Crocker & Park, 2004; Emmons, 1987; 
Tajfel & Forgas, 2000). Indeed, collective narcissism mediates the 
relationship between low self-esteem and out-group' derogation 
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2020).
There is recent evidence showing that collective narcissism is re-
lated to the endorsement of populist beliefs in a number of countries. 
In countries like the United States and Britain, collective narcissism 
may be triggered by perceived threats to group identity by some 
radical leftist policies such as political correctness and identity pol-
itics (Myers, 2019; Putnam et al., 2018). In a representative national 
survey in the United States, those who scored high on collective nar-
cissism had more favorable views of Donald Trump and were more 
likely to vote for him (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). Collective 
narcissism was also related to a growing belief in conspiracy theories 
during Trump's campaign (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). Voters 
who felt that the status of their reference group and the standing of 
their nation was challenged were especially responsive to slogans 
like “America First” and “Make America great again.”
Here, we also looked at relative deprivation, the perception that 
one's own group is disadvantaged compared to others, as a factor in 
populist attitudes (Pettigrew, 2017; Runciman, 1966). We compared 
its effects to those of collective narcissism on predicting the support 
for populist parties. Populist leaders often use narratives of relative 
deprivation to create a sense of grievance (Mols & Jetten, 2016). 
Emphasis on relative deprivation, in turn, appears linked to an 
increase in collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; 
Marchlewska et al., 2017).
The 2016 Brexit referendum was also marked by a number of 
narcissistic themes such as feelings that the EU was undermining the 
political status and autonomy of Britain. A recent study found that 
collective narcissism, social dominance orientation, and right-wing 
authoritarianism all predicted xenophobia and the Brexit vote (Golec 
de Zavala et al., 2017). Collective narcissism was most directly related 
to concerns over the image of the national group, its purity, grandi-
osity, and uniqueness. A similar pattern has also been observed in 
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Poland, where collective narcissism was a significant predictor of the 
support for the right-wing populist party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski in 
the presidential elections (Marchlewska et al., 2017). Can collective 
narcissism also play a role in Hungary's spectacular recent turn to 
populism and illiberalism? We shall turn to this question next.
1.2 | The rise of populism in Hungary
Hungary today is no longer a democratic country, and is the only EU 
member country classified as only partially free by Freedom House 
(2019, 2020; Wallen, 2018). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
and his Fidesz party established a de facto one-party state euphe-
mistically called the “System of National Cooperation.” Democratic 
institutions and the usual checks and balances have been eliminated, 
a new electoral law perpetuates one-party power, and extended di-
rect party control to the media, the judiciary, and most state institu-
tions (Garton Ash, 2019; Wallen, 2018). Hungary has fallen from the 
23rd to the 87th place on the international list of press freedom—
below Sierra Leone (Majtényi, 2019; Scheppele, 2013). In a widely 
criticized recent move Orbán obtained unlimited power to rule by 
decree allegedly in order to deal with the COVID-19 emergency. In 
its 2020 report, Freedom House classified Hungary as a “hybrid re-
gime” and as the first nondemocratic EU country, recording the most 
dramatic decline of any country assessed.
In an infamous speech on July 26, 2014, Mr. Orbán declared 
that Hungary is turning its back on liberal democracy and wants to 
model itself on autocratic Eastern states such as China, Turkey, and 
Russia, because liberal values today incorporate corruption, sex, and 
violence (Orbán, 2014). As Timothy Garton Ash concluded in the 
Guardian, Mr. Orbán “has demolished liberal democracy in his coun-
try over the last decade… he has used EU taxpayers' money to con-
solidate his illiberal regime… The state administration favours Orbán 
cronies and family members with government contracts, punishes 
independent media owners and NGO or opposition supporters with 
arbitrary tax investigations, uses state resources for Fidesz election 
propaganda… Fidesz has effectively demolished the independence 
of the judiciary, as documented in an extensive report by Judith 
Sargentini for the European Parliament. Reports by Transparency 
International and the European commission have found that in 
about 50% of public procurement procedures there was only one 
tender, and the procedures are corrupt” (Garton Ash, 2019). Orbán's 
childhood friend, until 2010 a gas fitter with no business experience, 
is now the second richest man in Hungary, and his son-in-law was 
found by Olaf, the EU's anti-corruption agency to be engaged in or-
ganized crime in stealing EU funds (Magyar, 2016).
Yet, Hungarian voters returned this government to power three 
times. The unrelenting government propaganda appealing to col-
lective narcissistic beliefs played a crucial role in legitimizing this 
process (Albright, 2018; see also Figure 1). We hypothesize that the 
F I G U R E  1   Examples of Hungarian 
government propaganda: Top left: “Our 
message to Brussels: we demand respect 
for Hungarians!” Top right: “Let's not 
allow Soros to have the last laugh!” Middle 
left: “Let's stop the candidates of Soros!” 
Middle right: “STOP” to migration. Bottom 
left: Runic writing of locality names. 
Bottom right: “Hungary will not give in!”
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carefully fueled sense of nationalism, grievance, and collective nar-
cissism provided a crucial component of Orbán's electoral success.
1.3 | The historical roots of collective narcissism
Unlike in some Western countries where collective narcissism may 
be the product of perceived attacks on a group's image by authori-
tarian leftist policies, political correctness, and identity politics 
(Myers, 2019), in Hungary it is historical traumas that provide the 
most fertile source of collective narcissism. For the last five hundred 
years, foreign occupation, unsuccessful revolutions, and military de-
feats characterize Hungarian history, producing a romantic vision of 
nationalism (Bibó, 1991; László & Fülöp, 2010; Lendvai, 2004). The 
guiding hallmarks of the Enlightenment, such as humanism, individu-
alism, liberalism, and the growth of an autonomous and independent 
bourgeoisie largely bypassed Hungary (Bibó, 1986; Lendvai, 2012). 
This traumatic history produced narratives that indicate a deep sense 
of grievance and a collective narcissistic sense of national identity, as 
confirmed by numerous surveys (Forgas et al., 2014; Inotai, 2007; 
Kelemen, 2010; Lendvai, 2004).
Hungarians live in a mental world that is characterized by pessi-
mism, grievance, and a close-minded cognitive style (Keller, 2010), 
supported by a poorly elaborated understanding of the causal forces 
that shaped their nation's history (László, 2014). These feelings are 
also reflected in the Hungarian national anthem focusing on suffer-
ing, victimhood, despair, complaint, and injustice, in contrast with 
the upbeat and optimistic national anthems of neighboring coun-
tries (Csepeli, 2018). Hungarians also score low on just world beliefs 
(Dolinski, 1996; Sallay & Krotos, 2004), and report lower perceived 
justice and trust (Kelemen, 2010). While many Western countries 
over-justify their political systems (Jost, 2019; Jost & Banaji, 1994), 
Hungarians showed the opposite trend, system derogation (Kelemen 
et al., 2014; Szilágyi & Kelemen, 2019). Despite this all-encompass-
ing pessimism, there persists a grandiose and narcissistic self-image 
(Forgas et al., 2014), also identified by Bibó (1991), László (2014), 
and Lendvai (2004). In one recent survey, 67% of upper-middle class 
Hungarians were satisfied with the autocratic regime, and many 
also evaluated positively the earlier dictatorial communist regime 
(Szilágyi & Kelemen, 2019). This marked inconsistency between the 
generally negative and pessimistic political attitudes expressed, on 
the one hand, and the unreasonably positive evaluation of the na-
tion, on the other hand, illustrates a pattern that is indicative of the 
presence of collective narcissistic attitudes. Indications of collective 
narcissism appear not only in surveys, but can also be empirically 
documented in the kind of linguistic narratives Hungarians use to 
describe themselves and their history, as we shall see next.
1.4 | Collective narcissism in national narratives
In an important empirical project László (2014; László & 
Ehmann, 2014) and his colleagues pioneered the use of quantitative 
text analysis of schoolbooks, literary works, and everyday conver-
sations to explore the mental world of Hungarians. Several studies 
found an overwhelming tendency for Hungarians to describe them-
selves as passive, and outgroups as agentic and dominant in produc-
ing historical events, indicating a prevalent victim mentality and the 
inadequate cognitive elaboration of historical traumas (László, 2014; 
László et al., 2010). The emotional reactions expressed in verbal nar-
ratives show that sadness and hope were the two emotions that most 
distinguished Hungarians from other nations (László & Fülöp, 2010). 
These results reflect a “vulnerable Hungarian national identity and 
a long-term adoption of the collective victim role… The emotional 
and cognitive organization of the Hungarian national identity as it 
is expressed in historical narratives shows a deep attachment to the 
glorious past and a relatively low level of cognitive and emotional 
elaboration of the twentieth century and earlier traumas… suggest-
ing that this historical trajectory is not the most favorable ground 
to build an emotionally stable identity” (László & Ehmann, 2014, pp. 
216–217).
Despite the perceived lack of agency and negative emotionality, 
average self-evaluations of Hungarians were paradoxically and con-
sistently most positive, again consistent with a narcissistic mindset. 
The inflated evaluations of their nation absolved Hungary of blame 
for aversive events they were responsible for (such as the deporta-
tion of Hungarian Jews during WWII, lost wars, etc.). Based on his 
extensive research, László (2014) concludes that “The emotional and 
cognitive organisation of Hungarian national identity is profoundly 
tied to… a distant glorious past and a subsequent series of defeats 
and losses… the characteristic emotions of the Hungarian national 
identity are fear, sadness, disappointment, enthusiasm and hope… 
Hungarians' sense of agency is very low” (p. 95). Hungarians' emo-
tional landscape also “includes inflated self-evaluations accompa-
nied by the degradation of outgroups” (p. 96), a pattern consistent 
with collective narcissism.
1.5 | Collective narcissistic propaganda
Autocratic regimes regularly use propaganda to appeal to a sense 
of grievance and collective narcissism, and this is also the case 
in Hungary (Albright, 2018). Narratives emphasizing collective 
victimhood, nostalgia, and narcissism may function as protective 
psychological devices, maintaining positive group identity by em-
phasizing moral superiority and victimhood (László, 2014). Well-
documented recent Hungarian state propaganda campaigns extoll 
citizens to “send a message to Brussels,” “demand more respect for 
Hungarians,” and “don't allow Juncker and Soros have the last laugh” 
(see Figure 1; see also https://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=AjT5p 
6kg8Hs). More recent Hungarian state propaganda claims that 
Hungary (actually one of the more secular countries in the region) 
is now a bastion defending Christian values against the twin on-
slaughts of Muslim migration, and godless western liberalism as 
exemplified by the EU (Hungarian Government Information, 2019; 
Tharoor, 2018).
     |  69LANTOS ANd FORGAS
A complementary propaganda strategy is the promotion of fake 
stories about unrecognized Hungarian greatness, with “historians” 
suggesting that Hungarian civilization preceded the Egyptians, 
Hungarians invented writing, and much else besides. For example, 
many Hungarian localities now proudly display locality names in 
runic writing (claimed to be a Hungarian invention) that the majority 
of people cannot actually read (Figure 1).
1.6 | The present studies
As this introduction indicates, there is reason to assume that collec-
tive narcissism indeed plays an important role in Hungary's recent 
turn toward autocracy. Although both survey research and narrative 
analyses suggest a collective narcissistic mindset, no previous study 
showed a direct empirical relationship between collective narcissism 
and voting behavior in Hungary. The studies reported here are the 
first to establish such a link.
Study 1 was conducted in 2017, during a time when governmental 
anti-EU messages were highly prevalent across television commercials 
and infamous billboards distributed across the country. We examined 
whether collective narcissism predicts conservatism, voting for the popu-
list Fidesz party, and negative attitudes toward the EU. We also assessed 
positivity toward the national in-group and controlled for it during the 
analyses. Finally, we assessed attitudes toward a neutral out-group', the 
United Kingdom, as a control condition. Study 2 was conducted in March 
of 2018, just prior to the national elections of April 8, 2018. During this 
campaign, the Fidesz party used xenophobic anti-migration propaganda 
across all platforms of the media. We thus also included a measure asking 
participants to indicate their subjective relative deprivation in relation to 
immigrants living in Hungary and controlled for it across the analyses. We 
also assessed political conservatism, voting for Fidesz in 2014, and plans 
to vote for Fidesz in 2018 to replicate the analyses conducted in Study 1.
We hypothesized that collective narcissism predicts populist at-
titudes (i.e., in Hungary, negative attitudes toward the EU), political 
conservatism, voting for Fidesz in 2014, and the intention to vote 
for Fidesz in 2018. Further, we sought to assess the relationship be-
tween collective narcissism, conservatism, and populism, following 
some prior evidence that collective narcissism and conservatism may 
independently predict populist attitudes such as support for Trump 
(Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018).
Ethical approval was granted by the Ethics Committee of 




A total of 287 participants who identified as Hungarian nation-
als completed the online survey. We excluded three participants 
who were not Hungarian citizens. The final sample consisted of 
284 participants, 200 females and 84 males. Their age range was 
between 18 and 72 (M = 33.12, SD = 12.39). Participants were re-
cruited through the social media platforms of Mindset Pszichológia, a 
Hungarian psychology center. Participants were told that the aim of 
the survey is to find out more about collective narcissism, but were 
not aware of any specific predictions. Data collection ceased on a 
predetermined date.
In order to determine the necessary sample size required for 
Studies 1 and 2, we searched the literature for correlation coeffi-
cients reported between collective narcissism and the support of 
populistic political parties and voting decisions: with support for 
Brexit in the United Kingdom: ra = .50, rb = .37 (Golec de Zavala 
et al., 2017, Studies 1 and 2) and rc = .47 (Marchlewska et al., 2017, 
Study 2); support for Donald Trump in the USA: rd = .28 (Federico & 
Golec de Zavala, 2018) and re = .29 (Marchlewska et al., 2017, Study 
3); and support for the ultraconservative Law and Justice party, 
rf = .24, and their leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, rg = .18 (Marchlewska 
et al., 2017, Study 1) in Poland. Out of these values, we used the 
most conservative correlation coefficient of rg = .18 to conduct an a 
priori sample size calculation using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007, 2009). 
The analysis suggested a necessary sample size of 202 participants 
to achieve the power of .80.
2.1.2 | Measures and procedure
We created the survey using Qualtrics software. After agreeing to 
an informed consent form, participants responded to basic demo-
graphic questions. They next indicated their responses on the fol-
lowing scales, presented in the following order.
Collective narcissism was assessed using the 5-item Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, e.g., “I will not be sat-
isfied until the Hungarian nation obtains respect it deserves”; α = .82, 
M = 2.24; SD = .99). Participants indicated their responses on a scale 
of 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree.
Attitudes toward the national in-group (in-group positivity) and 
the EU were measured with a slider task. In this task, participants 
were presented with five sliders in a randomized order, labeled 
with HU to represent Hungary, the national in-group (M = 69.12, 
SD = 23.84), EU, to represent the European Union (M = 71.40, 
SD = 22.09), UK, to represent a control national out-group' (United 
Kingdom; M = 66.01, SD = 20.49), AA, as a letter pair that has a 
meaning (Alcoholics Anonymous; M = 55.45, SD = 20.42), but is 
unrelated to nations, and BV, as a letter pair that does not con-
vey any meaning (M = 45.85, SD = 21.30). The meaning of the 
letter pairs was not explicitly stated. Participants were instructed 
to look at each of these stimuli and place the slider anywhere be-
tween 0 (negative emotions) and 100 (positive emotions) indicating 
the emotions they feel when seeing them.
Analyses related to the control UK letter pair are analyzed in the 
Supplementary Materials. These analyses revealed that in-group 
positivity predicted positive, while conservatism predicted negative 
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attitudes toward the United Kingdom. Collective narcissism was not 
a significant predictor of U.K. attitudes. The final two letter pairs 
(AA and BV) were included as filler items and are not analyzed here.
Support for Fidesz was assessed in two questions. Participants 
were asked to indicate whether they voted for Viktor Orbán in the 
2014 elections. The response options were yes (n = 47, dummy 
coded 1); no (n = 147, dummy coded 0); I did not vote (n = 69); I pre-
fer not to answer (n = 21). The next question asked participants to 
indicate whether they plan to vote for Viktor Orbán during the 2018 
elections. The response options were yes (n = 28, dummy coded 1); 
no (n = 212, dummy coded 0); I prefer not to answer (n = 44).
Only participants indicating a clear voting preference were in-
cluded in the analyses assessing Fidesz support and the point-bise-
rial correlations, excluding those who did not to respond or did not 
vote. Not responding or not voting may be due to multiple factors, 
making this response category difficult to interpret in any analysis 
(see Berinsky, 2004).
Political conservatism was assessed on a scale of 1 = liberal to 
6 = conservative (M = 2.81, SD = 1.24).
The procedure was concluded with a brief debriefing task.
2.2 | Results
The data set and corresponding syntax are available via OSF (https://
osf.io/867jx/).
2.2.1 | Correlations
Correlations between collective narcissism, political conservatism, 
in-group positivity, and attitudes toward the EU are presented in 
Table 1. As expected, collective narcissism was related to political 
conservatism, in-group positivity, and negative attitudes toward the 
EU. Political conservatism was further related to in-group positivity 
and negative attitudes toward the EU. in-group positivity and posi-
tive EU attitudes were also positively related to each other.
We next examined the point-biserial correlations between col-
lective narcissism and Fidesz support, including only respondents 
who indicated a voting preference. The results showed the predicted 
significant positive correlation between collective narcissism and 
voting for Orbán in the previous, 2014 election, rpb = .21, p = .004, 
as well as intending to vote for Orbán in the forthcoming, 2018 elec-
tion rpb = .32, p < .001.
2.2.2 | Regression analyses
We ran two multiple linear regression analyses to explore whether 
collective narcissism predicts political conservatism and attitudes 
toward the EU, while controlling for in-group positivity, age, and 
gender. We controlled for age and gender due to previous research 
indicating a relationship between these variables and conservative 
and populist political ideologies (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld 
et al., 2015). Omitting these covariates resulted in the same pattern 
of results (see Supplementary Materials).
The first regression predicted conservatism, with collective 
narcissism, in-group positivity, age, and gender as predictors. The 
results indicate that collective narcissism and ingroup positivity 
independently predicted conservatism (Table 2). Age and gender 
further predicted conservatism independent of collective narcis-
sism and ingroup positivity, with results indicating that older par-
ticipants and males were more likely to hold conservative beliefs, 
in line with previous findings (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld 
et al., 2015).
In the second regression analysis, attitudes toward the EU were 
predicted by collective narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gen-
der. Collective narcissism significantly predicted more negative EU 
attitudes, and ingroup positivity was related to positive EU attitudes. 
In Step 2, when conservatism was added it also became an indepen-
dent predictor of negative EU attitudes, while the previous patterns 
remained unchanged (Table 2).
We next looked at participants who indicated their voting behav-
ior in the 2014 elections. We ran a two-step binomial logistic regres-
sion with voting as the outcome variable. In Step 1, predictors were 
collective narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gender. Deleting 
age and gender as covariates yielded the same pattern of results (see 
Supplementary Materials). Collective narcissism and ingroup posi-
tivity both independently predicted Fidesz support in the 2014 elec-
tions (Table 3). In Step 2, conservatism was added and it became the 
only significant predictor of Fidesz support.
In a second two-step binomial logistic regression Fidesz support 
in the 2018 election was the outcome variable. In Step 1, collective 
narcissism, ingroup positivity, age, and gender were the predictors. 
Deleting age and gender as covariates yielded the same pattern of 
results (see Supplementary Materials). Only collective narcissism 
was a significant predictor of Fidesz support (Table 3). In Step 2, we 
also included conservatism. Both collective narcissism and conser-
vatism predicted Fidesz support independently.
2.2.3 | Post hoc mediation analyses
We conducted exploratory post hoc analyses to examine whether the 
relationship between collective narcissism and support for the Fidesz 
TA B L E  1   Correlations among the key variables in Study 1 
(N = 284)
1. 2. 3.
1. Collective narcissism –
2. Conservatism .21*** –
3. in-group positivity .21*** .23*** –
4. Attitudes toward the 
European Union
−.24*** −.40*** .15**
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01. 
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party may occur indirectly, via conservatism. Research suggests that 
collective narcissistic beliefs may increase under certain circumstances, 
such as following information regarding the ingroup's prolonged rela-
tive deprivation (Marchlewska et al., 2017). Similarly, contextual fac-
tors may lead to an increase in conservative attitudes (e.g., a global 
financial crisis; Milojev et al., 2015), whereas the support for populist 
values shows a growing global trend in recent years (Bornschier, 2017). 
These analyses explored whether it may then be plausible to anticipate 
that an increase in collective narcissistic beliefs leads to an increase in 
conservative attitudes, and that way indirectly to populist support. The 
analyses (presented in Supplementary Materials) revealed a significant 
indirect effect both with regards to past voting behavior and future 
voting intentions. These results may provide an explanation for why 
the effects of collective narcissism on past voting behavior faded out 
after accounting for conservatism in the model.
2.3 | Discussion
As predicted, collective narcissism was a significant predictor of con-
servatism, consistent with prior findings documenting such a link 
(e.g., Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). 
Collective narcissism also significantly predicted negative attitudes 
toward the EU. This reflects the incessant anti-EU rhetoric propaganda 
promoted by the populist Fidesz party in Hungary. At the time of data 
collection, giant billboards plastered throughout Hungary featured 
messages such as “Brussels must be stopped” or “Let's send a message to 
Brussels.” Such messages promote hypersensitivity to out-group' threat, 
a key feature of collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019; 
Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). Conservatism also emerged as a sig-
nificant independent predictor of negative EU attitudes.
As predicted, collective narcissism significantly predicted sup-
port of the Fidesz party in 2014 and 2018, as also found elsewhere 
(e.g., Donald Trump in the USA; Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland; 
Brexit in the United Kingdom; Marchlewska et al., 2017). However, 
when we added conservatism, the effects of collective narcissism 
disappeared in one analysis, but remained significant in the sec-
ond, indicating the need for further exploration of this relationship 
in Study 2. It appears that when conservatism is also measured, 
the effects of collective narcissism on political populism are mark-
edly reduced. Post hoc analyses suggest that collective narcissism 
may indirectly affect populist support, via an increase in conserva-
tism. Experimental or longitudinal testing of this prediction is nec-
essary to confirm the results, yet, our analyses provide preliminary 
indications of the effect. We aimed to replicate these findings in 
Study 2.
TA B L E  3   Results of the binomial logistic regression analyses conducted in Study 1
Outcome Predictor
Step 1 Step 2
B SE B OR
95% CI for 
OR B SE B OR
95% CI for 
OR
Voting in 2014 
(N = 194)
Constant −3.82*** .94 .02 – −5.87*** 1.16 .003 –
Collective narcissism .41* .17 1.51 [1.08, 2.12] .33 .20 1.39 [.94, 2.04]
Ingroup positivity .02* .01 1.02 [1.00, 1.04] .01 .01 1.01 [.99, 1.03]
Age .01 .25 1.01 [.98, 1.03] −.002 .02 1.00 [.97, 1.03]
Gender .24 .36 1.27 [.58, 2.78] .76 .46 2.13 [.87, 5.26]
Conservatism – – – – .90*** .18 2.45 [1.73, 3.46]
R2 = .07 (Cox & Snell), .11 (Nagelkerke) R2 = .22 (Cox & Snell), .33 (Nagelkerke)
Model χ2(4) = 14.22** Model χ2(5) = 48.56***
Voting in 2018 
(N = 240)
Constant −6.17*** 1.22 .002 – −8.99*** 1.60 <.001 –
CN .87*** .21 2.38 [1.57, 3.61] .97*** .25 2.64 [1.62, 4.28]
Ingroup positivity .02 .01 1.02 [.995, 1.04] .01 .01 1.01 [.99, 1.03]
Age .02 .02 1.02 [.99, 1.06] .02 .02 1.02 [.98, 1.05]
Gender .01 .46 1.01 [.41, 2.51] .27 .50 1.31 [.50, 3.48]
Conservatism – – – – .96*** .21 2.61 [1.73, 3.93]
R2 = .11 (Cox & Snell), .20 (Nagelkerke) R2 = .20 (Cox & Snell), .38 (Nagelkerke)
Model χ2(4) = 26.48*** Model χ2(5) = 52.29***
Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females.
Abbreviation: OR, odds ratio.
***p < .001; **p < .01. 




A total of 271 participants completed the online survey. Six par-
ticipants who were not solely Hungarian citizens or were under-
age were excluded resulting in a final sample of 265 participants, 
204 females and 61 males. Their age range was between 18 and 92 
(M = 29.69, SD = 12.33). Participants were again recruited through 
the social media platforms of Mindset Pszichológia, a Hungarian psy-
chology center. Participants were told that the aim of the survey is 
to find out more about collective narcissism, but were not aware of 
any specific predictions. In return for their time, participants were 
entered in a prize draw for tickets to psychology-related events or-
ganized by Mindset Pszichológia. Data collection ceased on a prede-
termined date.
3.1.2 | Measures and procedure
We created the survey using Qualtrics software. After agreeing to 
an informed consent form, participants responded to basic demo-
graphic questions. They next indicated their responses on the fol-
lowing scales, presented in the following order.
Collective narcissism was assessed as in Study 1 (α = .73, M = 2.64; 
SD = .93).
Relative deprivation was assessed with the item “Over the past 
five years the economic situation of those similar to me in Hungary 
has been ___ than that of immigrants living Hungary,” where par-
ticipants had to fill in the blank with options ranging from 1 = much 
better to 5 = much worse (M = 2.17, SD = .90).
Support for populism was assessed across two questions. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether they voted for the 
Fidesz party in 2014 on response options yes (n = 40, dummy 
coded 1); no (n = 115, dummy coded 0); I did not vote (n = 82); 
I prefer not to answer (n = 28). Participants were then asked to 
indicate whether they plan to vote for the Fidesz party during 
the 2018 elections using the response options yes (n = 31, 
dummy coded 1); no (n = 176, dummy coded 0); I prefer not to 
answer (n = 58). As in Study 1, we excluded participants who 
reported either not voting or not wanting to respond (Berinsky, 
2004).
Political conservatism was assessed on a scale of 1 = liberal to 
6 = conservative (M = 2.77, SD = 1.15). Finally, participants received 
a short debriefing.
3.2 | Results
The data set and corresponding syntax are available via OSF (https://
osf.io/867jx/).
3.2.1 | Correlations
We again observed positive significant correlations between collec-
tive narcissism and conservatism, and between conservatism and 
self-reported relative deprivation. There was a marginally significant 
positive relationship between collective narcissism and self-reported 
relative deprivation (Table 4).
We next examined the point-biserial correlations between col-
lective narcissism and Fidesz support, including only respondents 
who indicated a voting preference. The results indicate a significant 
positive correlation between collective narcissism and voting for 
Fidesz in 2014, rpb = .18, p = .03. We also found a significant positive 
correlation between collective narcissism and the intention to vote 
for Fidesz in 2018, rpb = .20, p = .004.
3.2.2 | Regression analyses
We ran three sets of regression analyses evaluating the predic-
tors of conservatism, Fidesz support in 2014, and in 2018. Based 
on some prior evidence we controlled for age and gender in these 
analyses, (e.g., Cornelis et al., 2009; Harteveld et al., 2015). The 
results were not affected by removing these covariates (see the 
Supplementary Materials). We additionally controlled for perceived 
relative deprivation across the analyses (Marchlewska et al., 2017).
In a linear regression analysis, collective narcissism and relative 
deprivation independently predicted conservatism (Table 5).
Next, two binomial logistic regression analyses predicting Fidesz 
support in 2014 and in 2018 were performed, including only respon-
dents who declared a clear voting preference.
Fidesz support in 2014, in Step 1, was predicted only by collective 
narcissism, with age, gender, and relative deprivation having no signifi-
cant effect (Table 6). In Step 2, we added conservatism as an additional 
predictor, and it became the only significant predictor of Fidesz support.
Fidesz support in 2018, in Step 1, was again significantly pre-
dicted by collective narcissism, but not by age, gender, or relative 
deprivation (Table 6). In Step 2, when conservatism was added, it 
became the only significant predictor of Fidesz support.
3.2.3 | Post hoc meditation analyses
As in Study 1, we conducted exploratory post hoc analyses investi-
gating whether collective narcissism may indirectly lead to populist 
TA B L E  4   Correlations among the key variables in Study 2 
(N = 265)
1. 2.
1. Collective narcissism –
2. Conservatism .32*** –
3. Relative deprivation .12+  .19**
***p < .001; **p < .01; +p < .06. 
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support via increased conservatism. Two mediation models, look-
ing at past voting behavior and future voting intentions as the out-
comes, support this prediction. The analyses are presented in the 
Supplementary Materials.
3.3 | Discussion
Study 2 found support for the hypotheses that collective narcissism 
predicts conservatism and Fidesz support in the 2014 and 2018 na-
tional elections. These effects were not influenced by age, gender, 
or relative deprivation. Study 2 was conducted shortly before the 
2018 national elections, when the Fidesz propaganda highlighted 
the threat posed by immigrants. While perceived relative depriva-
tion emerged as an independent predictor of conservatism, it did not 
significantly predict support for the populist Fidesz party.
We observed a similar effect on populist voting preferences to 
those reported in Study 1 when investigating the predictors of past 
voting behavior; once conservatism was added to the model, col-
lective narcissism no longer predicted Fidesz support (past voting 
behavior or future voting intention) significantly. Post hoc analy-
ses further suggest that the effect of collective narcissism on the 
support for populist government is mediated by conservatism. In 
other words, as in previous analysis, conservatism again emerged 
as a key determinant on whether collective narcissism does or does 
not predict populist support. However, it should be noted that the 
Outcome Predictor B SE B β 95% CI
Conservatism Constant 1.44*** .33 – [.78, 2.10]
Collective narcissism .37*** .07 .30 [.23, .51]
Relative deprivation .21** .01 .16 [.06, .35]
Age .003 .01 .03 [−.01, .01]
Gender −.22 .16 −.08 [−.53, .09]
R2 = .14
Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females.
***p < .001; **p < .01. 
TA B L E  5   Results of the multiple linear 
regression analysis conducted in Study 2 
(N = 265)
TA B L E  6   Results of the binomial logistic regression analyses conducted in Study 2
Outcome Predictor
Step 1 Step 2
B SE B OR
95% CI for 
OR B SE B OR
95% CI for 
OR
Voting in 2014 
(N = 155)
Constant −2.88** 1.00 .06 – −4.08*** 1.16 .02 –
Collective narcissism .46* .30 1.59 [1.07, 2.35] .18 .22 1.20 [.77, 1.86]
Relative deprivation .29 .22 1.33 [.87, 2.03] .13 .23 1.14 [.73, 1.79]
Age −.02 .02 .99 [.96, 1.02] −.02 .02 .98 [.95, 1.01]
Gender .52 .49 1.68 [.65, 4.35] .82 .53 2.26 [.80, 6.40]
Conservatism – – – – .81*** .20 2.25 [1.51, 3.33]
R2 = .06 (Cox & Snell), .09 (Nagelkerke) R2 = .17 (Cox & Snell), .25 (Nagelkerke)
Model χ2(4) = 9.70* Model χ2(5) = 28.49***
Voting in 2018 
(N = 207)
Constant −3.86*** 1.08 .02 – −6.10*** 1.38 .002 –
Collective narcissism .58** .21 1.79 [1.20, 2.68] .22 .24 1.25 [.77, 2.00]
Relative deprivation −.02 .22 .98 [.63, 1.52] −.22 .26 .80 [.48, 1.34]
Age −.001 .02 1.00 [.97, 1.03] −.003 .02 1.00 [.96, 1.04]
Gender .71 .55 2.03 [.69, 5.91] 1.21+  .63 3.34 [.97, 11.53]
Conservatism – – – – 1.07*** .21 2.92 [1.93, 4.44]
R2 = .05 (Cox & Snell), .08 (Nagelkerke) R2 = .19 (Cox & Snell), .32 (Nagelkerke)
Model χ2(4) = 9.95* Model χ2(5) = 42.31***
Note: Gender was coded 0 for males, 1 for females.
Abbreviation: OR, odds ratio.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p = .06. 
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mediation analyses presented here were exploratory and the data 
correlational.
These analyses were successful in replicating the findings ob-
served in Study 1. This is the first time that the complex relation-
ship between collective narcissism, conservatism, and support for 
populist parties was empirically explored. The replication of these 
results across two independent samples is a crucial indicator of the 
reliability of the observed effects.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
These two studies provide convergent evidence supporting our 
hypothesis that collective narcissism plays an important, but not 
independent role in explaining support for the current populist auto-
cratic regime in Hungary. In addition to predicting voting intentions 
for Orbán's illiberal regime, collective narcissism was also closely re-
lated to conservatism and negative attitudes toward supranational 
entities such as the EU. These findings are also broadly consistent 
with studies assessing the relationship between collective narcis-
sism and support for populism in other countries such as the USA 
(Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018), the United Kingdom (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2017), and Poland (Marchlewska et al., 2017).
We also found that conservatism influenced the effects of col-
lective narcissism on predicting populist support in several of our 
analyses. Once added as a covariate to three out of the four models 
investigating the variables predicting support of the populist gov-
ernment, the independent effects of collective narcissism faded out. 
It may be the case that conservatism is simply a stronger predic-
tor of political behavior, as it reflects an explicitly political attitude. 
Collective narcissism has been shown to significantly predict polit-
ical behavior (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala 
et al., 2019), yet, it may reflect more strongly on beliefs about the 
ingroup than explicitly political attitudes. Its effects in predicting 
voting behavior may fade out once conservatism is accounted for 
due to the positive correlation between these variables.
In an exploratory manner, we tested a post hoc prediction to 
provide an alternative explanation to these findings. We found that 
the effects of collective narcissism on predicting populist support 
may occur indirectly, via increased conservatism. Only one prior 
study looked at both collective narcissism and conservatism as pre-
dictors of populist support for Trump, finding both to be indepen-
dent predictors (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018). We observed 
that conservatism mediated the effects of collective narcissism on 
Fidesz support in four independent analyses. Collective narcis-
sistic beliefs, conservative attitudes, and populist support are all 
subject to change under various circumstances (Bornschier, 2017; 
Marchlewska et al., 2017; Milojev et al., 2015). We thus propose 
that as collective narcissism increases (e.g., following prolonged ex-
posures to government propaganda targeting collective narcissistic 
hypersensitivity), political ideologies may become more extreme as 
well (either more conservative or liberal depending on the ingroup 
and political environment in question). Such more extreme political 
attitudes may in turn indirectly account for the increase in (right- or 
left-wing) populist support. Our results support this theorizing. Yet, 
it should be noted that the analyses presented here are preliminary 
and the data is correlational. To gain a confirmation of these re-
sults, they should be replicated using experimental or longitudinal 
research designs.
4.1 | Theoretical and practical significance
The recent rise of populist, illiberal movements represents a chal-
lenge to widely shared beliefs about the superiority of Western 
liberal democracy (Albright, 2018; Pinker, 2018). In seeking an ex-
planation for this puzzling phenomenon, we must try to understand 
the mental representations of voters who are attracted to populist, 
nationalist ideologies. Both the study of history (Hobsbawm, 1992), 
and the psychological experiments pioneered by Tajfel on intergroup 
discrimination suggest that the need for positive group identity is a 
major motivating force in human affairs (Tajfel & Forgas, 2000). Our 
studies show that challenged group identity often leads to feelings 
of collective narcissism, which, when embedded in a conservative 
ideology, provide an important component of the support for popu-
list regimes. Countries such as Hungary suffered from a traumatic 
past that provides few reasons for citizens to derive genuine positive 
identity and distinctiveness from their flawed history. Centuries of 
oppression produced a pessimistic victim mentality, and the ideol-
ogy and mental habits of robust individualism have not had a chance 
to establish themselves.
These two studies were the first to empirically demonstrate the 
effects of collective narcissism on the support for populist politics in 
Hungary, a country that progressed further along the road toward 
autocracy and illiberalism than any other country within the EU, and 
what is sometimes described as a “mafia state” (Garton Ash, 2019; 
The Economist, 2019; Magyar, 2016). Unlike populist movements 
elsewhere, Hungary's Fidesz regime has now succeeded in winning 
three consecutive elections, so understanding the mindset of voters 
who consciously endorse autocracy is of considerable importance.
The empirical data we report are perhaps best interpreted as 
consistent with the analysis of Hungary's traumatic history, as well 
as survey research of political attitudes and political narratives 
we discuss in the introduction. A deeply challenged and traumatic 
history, pessimistic attitudes, and negative narratives all confirm 
a streak of collective narcissism in the way many Hungarians see 
themselves and their place in the world. Victim mentality, lack of 
agency, negative emotions combined with unrealistically positive 
self-evaluation and a fundamentally conservative outlook amount to 
a propensity to endorse a collective narcissistic mindset that eventu-
ally produces voting preferences for an illiberal regime (Bibó, 1991; 
Kelemen, 2010; László, 2014; Lendvai, 2012).
The role of manipulative government propaganda in exploiting 
collective narcissism cannot be overestimated. The cultivation of a 
collective sense of national grievance and victimhood paired with a col-
lective narcissistic overevaluation of the ingroup has been a recurring 
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propaganda strategy used by populist leaders such as Mussolini, 
Hitler, Putin, Erdogan, and Orbán to generate political legitimacy 
(Albright, 2018). Conservative propaganda themes such as claims that 
Hungary is fighting a life-and-death struggle for recognition, defend-
ing Christianity, and resisting colonization by the EU and international 
conspirators may seem farfetched, but they do serve to potentiate the 
deep sense of collective narcissism experienced by significant por-
tions of the Hungarian electorate (Kelemen, 2010; László, 2014). Our 
first study was conducted in 2017, when Fidesz propaganda distrib-
uted across the country openly attacked the EU, with messages such 
as “Let's send a message to Brussels: Hungarians deserve more respect!” 
(see also Figure 1). Study 2 was carried out at a time when blatantly 
xenophobic propaganda was employed across all media against immi-
grants. In this climate, it is not surprising that collective narcissism was 
related to perceptions of self-reported relative deprivation.
It should be noted that the processes we described throughout 
this manuscript are not all unique to Hungary. In particular, the link 
between national collective narcissism and receptivity to populist 
ideology are observable in a number of other countries as well (e.g., 
Poland, United Kingdom, and USA; Marchlewska et al., 2017). The 
historical traumas we reflect on throughout this manuscript are just 
one of several possible sources of collective narcissism, which may 
not apply universally to other countries. Nevertheless, the conse-
quences of collective narcissism seem universal, and thus, the pres-
ent findings may be indicative of collective narcissistic behavior in 
different national contexts as well.
4.2 | Limitations
The present studies, although yielding impressively convergent re-
sults, also suffer from some limitations. The samples are unlikely to 
be representative of all Hungarian voters. There are considerable 
differences in the proportion of the samples who indicated support-
ing Fidesz and those who did not, which also lowers the statistical 
power of our analyses. Fidesz won the Hungarian national elections 
shortly before (2014) and after (2018) our data collection with the 
majority votes, and this is not reflected in our data. However, as 
our respondents were recruited from the privileged group of active 
web users, we might assume that less well-educated voters might 
actually show an even stronger link between collective narcissism 
and political behavior, a prediction worthy of further examination 
(Pinker, 2018). It would be desirable to replicate our results in a na-
tionally representative sample.
Examining participants who decided not to respond to questions 
about party preferences and those who decided not to vote may yield 
further interesting insights. Pooling such participants into a single 
category would result in a heterogeneous and confounded sample 
likely to lead to uninterpretable conclusions (Berinsky, 2004). Future 
studies might probe more deeply the reasons why respondents fail 
to reveal their party preferences. One possible reason worthy of 
analysis is the deeply polarized and intolerant political atmosphere 
in countries like Hungary. Collecting further data about demograph-
ics factors, such as income or education, and personality would also 
help to more firmly establish our findings.
5  | CONCLUSION
This paper reports the first empirical evidence indicating that col-
lective narcissism is a significant, albeit perhaps indirect predictor 
of populist attitudes in Hungary, the most illiberal country within 
the EU. We found that conservatism influences the effects of col-
lective narcissism, an important finding in understanding how men-
tal representations shape political attitudes. As Plato noted more 
than 2000 years ago, one of the greatest dangers for democracy is 
that ordinary people are all too easily swayed by the emotional and 
deceptive rhetoric of ambitious politicians. Evolutionary psycho-
logical research on the fundamental characteristics of human cog-
nition now confirms that humans are indeed highly predisposed to 
embrace fictitious symbolic belief systems as a means of enhancing 
group cohesion and coordination (Harari, 2014; von Hippel, 2018). 
We believe that collective narcissism is a promising construct in our 
quest to fully understand the psychological variables responsible 
for the recent historical rise of populist and illiberal political move-
ments worldwide. We hope that this paper will help to stimulate fur-
ther interest in this fascinating and as yet incompletely understood 
phenomenon.
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